Brazilian gangs

[Junior]

Inmates take 100 people hostage at prison in Brazil
BBC News, April 16, 2012

Prisoners at a jail in north-eastern Brazil have taken about 100 people hostage during a riot.

Some 400 prisoners in Aracaju started a revolt over the weekend and are said to be armed with knives and three rifles stolen from a weapons room.

They accuse guards of mistreating them and want better conditions, as well as greater respect for female visitors.

Three of the hostages are guards, while the rest are relatives of prisoners, police say.

Some of the hostages are women and children who were visiting when the uprising started.

'Talks deadlocked'

Originally about 130 people were taken hostage but 28 were released on Monday morning.

There are no reports of deaths or injuries so far, according to the Agencia Brasil news agency.

Prisoners accuse guards of committing abuses and say they will give a list of names to the local authorities.

A local police official, Captain Marcos Carvalho, AFP news agency the authorities had rejected the prisoners' demands and negotiations had hit an impasse.

More than 150 police officers have been sent to the facility in Sergipe state to deal with the crisis.

Overcrowding has become a major problem in Brazil's prisons. The Aracaju jail was built to house 2,000 people but is now holding approximately 4,000.

[Junior]

Inmates release all hostages held at Brazil prison
BBC News, April 17, 2012

Prisoners at a jail in north-eastern Brazil have released all the people they took hostage during a riot.

Some 400 prisoners in Aracaju started a revolt over the weekend and were said to be armed with knives and three rifles stolen from a weapons room.

They accused guards of mistreating them and demanded better conditions, as well as greater respect for female visitors.

Officials said the hostages were freed unharmed, after the authorities pledged to investigate the inmates' complaints.

There had been 24 hours of negotiations between officials and prisoners.

The five leaders of the rebellion were transferred to another prison.

Three of the hostages were guards, while the rest were relatives of prisoners who were visiting the jail at the time the riot started, police say.

'Unacceptable demands'

Originally about 130 people were taken hostage but 28 were released on Monday morning.

The Public Safety Secretary for Sergipe, Joao Eloy said most of the demands made by the inmates could only be met only by the court system, he told the Agence France-Presse news agency.

"We did all that was possible and reasonable and will investigate their complaints," Mr Eloy said.

But he said other demands were unacceptable, such as the call for the prison governor to be removed.

Prisoners accused guards of committing abuses and say they will give a list of names to the local authorities.

They also complained that women visitors were the subject of abuse.

More than 150 police officers were sent to the facility in Sergipe state to deal with the crisis.

Overcrowding has become a major problem in Brazil's prisons. The Aracaju jail was built to house 2,000 people but is now holding approximately 4,000.

[Junior]

Rio Gangs Prohibit Crack Sales to Avoid Police Clean-Up
Written by Geoffrey Ramsey, InSight
Tuesday, June 26, 2012

Drug traffickers have banned the sale of crack cocaine in three of Rio de Janeiro's favelas, in an apparent attempt to discourage a police clean-up that suggests the city's security strategy is bearing fruit.

On June 20, Brazil’s O Globo reported that gangs in the Rio favela of Jacarezinho had posted signs which prohibited the sale of crack in the community. The ban also applied to the neighboring slums of Mandela and Manguinhos.

Antonio Carlos Costa, head of local community organization Rio de Paz, told the newspaper that the decision was made because of the toll that crack addiction had taken on the neighborhoods.

Police, however, believed that the move was motivated more by self-interest than community solidarity, reported O Globo. Rio authorities have been stepping up efforts to clean up so-called “cracolandias” (favelas where crack use is highly prevalent) in recent months, sending security forces to the areas in order to rein in criminal activity.

As such, the prohibition on crack sales could have been designed to deter law enforcement from the area, so that local drug traffickers could carry on selling other drugs that attract less attention, and continue criminal activities like extortion.

InSight Crime Analysis

Even if the cynicism of O Globo’s police sources is accurate, the crack ban is likely still a positive development for security in Rio. If drug trafficking organizations are taking it upon themselves to limit their activity even in areas where crackdowns have not been implemented, this could be a sign of the effectiveness of the city’s security strategy.

Rio is currently implementing a security push that involves targeting certain favelas with an invasion by security forces, followed by the long-term presence of Pacifying Police Units (UPPs) trained in community policing. The program earned some mixed praise from Human Rights Watch this month. The human rights watchdog said the scheme had the potential to lower violence, but said that complaints of abuses committed by police, including extrajudicial killings, were still not properly addressed by Rio authorities.

[Junior]

Corruption Case Exposes Influence of Brazilian Animal Game Boss
Written by Christopher Looft, InSight, Thursday, June 28, 2012

The case against a Brazilian gambling boss known as "Carlinhos Cachoeira" has toppled a senator's career, pulled an Olympic contract from one of the country's biggest firms, and brought threats on prosecutors, suggesting the extent of the kingpin's influence in society.

Marcio Thomaz Bastos, former Brazilian attorney general and current legal counsel of Carlos Augusto Ramos, more commonly known as "Carlinhos Cachoeira" (Charlie Waterfall), has filed a request with the Supreme Court, seeking the release of his client. Bastos cited the 120 days Cachoeira has spent in detention so far, asking the court to consider the welfare of the defendant's three children, Jornal do Brasil reported.

Given the scale of his alleged offenses, Ramos' fatherhood will likely not do much to get him off in the long term -- in a blog post one former Rio de Janeiro state prosecutor compared Cachoeira to Michael Corleone, the "Godfather" of the eponymous gangster film. The kingpin rose to power running "bicho," also known as the "animal game," a century-old lottery invented by a struggling zookeeper that eventually became a major money laundering asset for organized crime.

His network was reportedly worth up to $15 million, laundered through dozens of front companies. To keep the lucrative criminal enterprise running smoothly, Cachoeira appears to have courted an extensive network of political and business contacts, which helps explain why his arrest and its fallout have captured Brazil's attention for the last four months.

Cachoeira was arrested in February following a 15-month federal police operation to break up a massive gambling scheme. The operation centered on illegal gambling in Goias state, central Brazil, but following his arrest, the wide scope of Cachoeira's influence became clear. According to a report by the Terra news website, on the day of Cachoeira's arrest, his alleged links to Goias Senator Demostenes Torres began to emerge. The gambling boss ("bicheiro" in Portuguese) allegedly gave Torres a refrigerator for a wedding gift -- and $1.7 million.

Days later, recordings were made public which apparently showed three Goias federal congressmen peddling favors for gifts from Cachoeira. A congressional inquiry into Cachoeira's government ties was opened in April. For his part, Torres' career appears to be over, as he awaits the final word on whether he will be sacked. Cachoeira, it seems, had much to offer politicians like Torres. In one case, he reportedly connected a radio broadcaster with Goias' current governor, offering the journalist tens of thousands of dollars to help coordinate the governor's campaign.

In addition to his deals with politicians, Cachoeira's political connections made him a power broker in the private sector. He is suspected of working with the construction firm Delta, Brazil's largest single recipient of federal funds in the past three years, according to a report by the Direto de Brasilia news service. Cachoeira reportedly leveraged his vast network of political connections to help Delta use bribes to secure valuable construction contracts.

As a result of the case, Delta projects have been shut down throughout Brazil. The firm was forced to pull out of the renovation project for Rio de Janeiro's Maracana stadium, which is set to host the final match of the 2014 FIFA World Cup. More recently, a municipality in Sao Paulo state suspended a $75 million project by a Delta-led consortium to build a park, pending investigations into potential irregularities, including the possibility the government may have overpaid for the project. Delta director Fernando Cavendish, a close friend of Rio Governor Sergio Cabral, was forced to step down.

The case has had more sinister consequences. Brazil's National Council of Public Prosecution has opened an investigation into threats against one of its prosecutors who helped put Cachoeira behind bars. The prosecutor, according to a report by the G1 news service, received an e-mail this month with the word "Caution" in its subject line. "[expletive], we will still get you. Watch out, you and your family are in danger," the message read. Earlier this month, the judge who authorized Cachoeira's detention asked to be removed from the congressional inquiry, citing threats by Goias police against himself and his family. His request was granted, threatening to delay the inquiry.

The Cachoeira case shows the reach of political corruption in Brazil. Business moguls, governors, legislators, journalists and police have all been linked to Cachoeira in one way or another, and the gambling kingpin was even reportedly involved in the 2004 "mensalao" corruption scandal that almost toppled the ruling Worker's Party (PT). But the future of the case against the gambling boss is uncertain. While the investigation is likely to generate new political casualties, there are strong forces pushing to limit its fallout. As Julia Michaels at RioReal has noted, many of the country's corruption cases simply fizzle out; "there's a saying in Portuguese for what happens for what happens to any Brazilian investigation: vai acabar em pizza, 'it all ends in pizza.'"

[Junior]

Rio Drug Boss Surrenders to Police, Citing Pressures of Business
Written by Christopher Looft, InSight, Thursday, June 28, 2012

A drug boss in Rio de Janeiro's North Zone surrendered to the authorities shortly before his stronghold was due to receive an influx of police, explaining that he wants to spend more time with his family.

Cristiano Santos Guedes, alias "Puma," a drug boss in the Morro da Quitanda favela in the northern Rio neighborhood of Costa Barros, has turned himself in, G1 reported. There were reportedly four warrants for his arrest for drug trafficking and attempted murder.

A top Rio state intelligence official said Puma was part of the same group as the captured trafficker Antonio Bonfim Lopes, known as "Nem." Nem headed the Amigos dos Amigos gang, and was based in Rocinha favela until his capture in November last year.

Puma was taken to the authorities by the head of the NGO Afroreggae, whose services he had first sought out in September last year. "I did this here for my family. I was spending lots of time hiding, and that's not cool," the trafficker reportedly said. "The suffering of drug trafficking is very great. Sometimes I wanted to talk to my daughter, wanted to take her to school even and I couldn't. Today I am reborn and I'm very happy."

The accused drug boss was arrested in 2007, but skipped bail and stayed on the run until turning himself in this week.

InSight Crime Analysis

Puma had reason to flee the neighborhood. The trafficker's resignation follows an announcement that Costa Barros would be receiving extra police presence, while a rash of gang violence in the area has claimed many suspected traffickers.

The outbreak of killings may have been sparked by police occupations elsewhere in the city, such as the favelas of Macacos and Rocinha, which have forced traffickers to flee to Rio's North Zone. The resulting influx of traffickers in areas like Costa Barros has ignited turf warfare between groups. It's possible that Puma's surrender was connected to this gang warfare, and that his life was in danger if he stayed on the streets.

While the head of the UPP program said the nearby Costa Barros favela of Chapadao was bound for a unit, following the death of a 19-year-old woman (shot with her daughter on her lap) during a confrontation between police and traffickers, he did not offer a specific date for the unit's installation, the R7 news website reported.

[Junior]

Rio de Janeiro Homicides Reach 21-Year Low
Written by Tracey Knott, InSight
Friday, June 29, 2012

In the state of Rio de Janeiro, homicides have fallen to the lowest level since 1991, another indicator of the growing success of Brazil's “pacification” project.

The Regional Institute of Public Safety reported that Rio de Janeiro’s homicide rate for the first five months of 2012 is the lowest in 21 years. So far, the 2012 rate is at 10.9 homicides per 100,000 residents. Homicides fell to 1,784 — a 8.3 percent drop from last year, when 1,945 people were killed in the first five months.

Authorities attribute the decline to the government’s “pacification” project, which began in 2008 in an attempt to reduce violence in Brazil’s second largest city.

The news comes as Rio prepares to host the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic games.

InSight Crime Analysis

The decline in Rio’s homicides appears to be a sign that pacification is working, along with other recent indicators of the program’s success. On June 28, a Rio neighborhood drug boss surrendered to police, reportedly due to pressures from increased police activity and gang competition in his territory. The boss operated in the northern part of the city, which has the largest concentration of Police Pacification Units (UPPs).

However, the pacification program is not without problems. While a recent report by Human Rights Watch praised the project for cutting down violence overall, it warned of human rights violations by police such as extrajudicial killings.

The application of the pacification program is also unbalanced, resulting in uneven crime rates throughout the city. Terra Brazil noted that neighborhoods with UPPs had lower rates of violent crime than those without. Although the data indicates some level of success for the pacification project, a complete reduction in violence is unlikely until UPPs are more widespread in Rio.

[Junior]

Brazil gunmen kill eight amid football celebrations
BBC News, July 12, 2012

Eight people have been shot dead in greater Sao Paulo during celebrations for the win by local team Palmeiras in the Brazilian Cup final, police say.

Men on motorbikes and in cars drove through the town of Osasco, opening fire in different locations.

Police said the attackers took advantage of the partying to disguise their gunshots.

The victory meant Palmeiras qualified for the Copa Libertadores, South America's top club competition.

The gunmen opened fire indiscriminately in several parts of Osasco, which lies within the Sao Paulo metropolitan area, police said.

Seven people were killed on the spot and one later died in hospital. Another person was injured.

The shootings happened close to bars where drugs are sold, officers said.

There was no indication those killed were targeted for being football fans nor that the shootings were linked to the win by Palmeiras.

"The criminals took advantage of the time when people were setting off fireworks to disguise the sound of their guns," a police statement said.

Palmeiras triumphed in the cup final against Curitiba, winning 3-1 on aggregate.

[Junior]

Brazilian 'Red Command Gang Boss' Murdered in Paraguay
Written by Christopher Looft, InSight.com
Thursday, July 19, 2012

A suspected Brazilian gang leader based in one of Paraguay's key locations for smuggling contraband was gunned down while playing pool, pointing to the country's popularity as a safe haven for Brazilian criminals.

Osmar Jesus Chavez, alias "Bola de Fogo" ("fireball" in Portuguese) was playing pool at a bar some 40 kilometers from the Brazilian border when two gunmen burst in through the side door, their faces covered. The assassins, armed with shotguns, ordered Chavez and his companion to the floor and shot them in the head.

Chavez, an alleged commander of the notorious Brazilian prison gang the Red Command (Comando Vermelho) who lived a few blocks away from the bar where he was killed, apparently paid large sums to local authorities to avoid being "bothered," ABC reported.

The torched remains of a Chevrolet Vectra, believed to have been used by the gunmen for transport and then destroyed, was found some 10 kilometers from where the murders took place.

InSight Crime Analysis

That Chavez lived so close to the Brazilian border, apparently paying off local officials to operate unimpeded while using a fake Paraguayan ID, speaks of the country's lax law enforcement. (According to a previous ABC report, the trafficker's real name is Josimar Jesus and "Omar de Jesus Chavez" is his Paraguayan alias.) This has helped turn the country into a major cocaine trafficking hub for Brazilian gangs like the Red Command.

Chavez apparently considered Paraguay enough of a safe haven for him to remain there despite reportedly receiving threats from rival groups that caused him to hire extra security guards. The fact that he was based in Paraguay's Canindeyu department, which offers easy access to Ciudad del Este (a massive transit point for products illicitly entering Brazil), and Salto del Guaira, which is connected by a bridge to Brazil, could suggest that he was killed because his rivals wanted to establish a stronger hold on this strategic territory.

Chavez's death is only the latest indication of Red Command presence in Paraguay. The Brazilian Federal Police representative in Paraguay has previously complained that Brazilian traffickers are fleeing the security crackdowns in urban centers like Rio de Janeiro, and relocating to Paraguay.

[Junior]

Rio Loses First 'Pacifying' Police Officer to Gang Attack
Written by Christopher Looft, InSight
Wednesday, July 25, 2012

Traffickers have killed an officer from Rio de Janeiro's police pacification units in the first deadly attack on the elite force, throwing into doubt the community policing model's ability to keep control of the city's favelas.

Military police officer Fabiana Aparecida de Souza, of the Nova Brasilia Pacifying Police Unit (UPP) in the Complexo do Alemao neighborhood, died Monday in an attack on a police building by around 10 criminals, Veja reported.

Beginning Tuesday morning, police were sent to reinforce the area, including members of BOPE, an elite special-operations unit. Authorities have identified at least seven suspects, O Dia reported. By the end of Tuesday night, three adults and one teenager had been taken into police custody in connection with the attack.

According to Veja's report, Rio state governor Sergio Cabral released a statement expressing sympathy for the officer's family. "The state government believes that marginal groups are losing strength before the policies of public security and that actions like these demonstrate the desperation of criminal organizations," read an excerpt.

The influx of BOPE officers following the attack may delay the planned occupation of the Jacarezinho favela in Rio's North Zone in August. This is the city's third largest favela after Rocinha and Complexo do Alemao.

InSight Crime Analysis

The favela was first occupied by the security forces in November 2010 in a highly-publicized operation, and pacifying police took over Alemao after the military withdrew just under two months ago. That criminal bands in Alemao were bold enough to carry out an attack against police headquarters raises the question of whether the UPP is capable of holding its own in the favela. It also suggests that fully consolidating security in Alemao may require more resources than authorities expected.

It is particularly troubling that the attack took place in Alemao: the massive complex is among Rio's largest favelas, a longtime stronghold of its biggest gang, the Red Command (Comando Vermelho), and a symbol of the city's ambitious public security policy initiatives. Sending another surge of BOPE officers into the area, which has already been presented as pacified, may delay the city's pacification schedule in other communities.

However, the attack against the UPP may also be indicative that local criminals viewed the police unit as a serious threat which had to be confronted, despite the serious consequences this could bring. The attackers no doubt knew their assault would provoke a major backlash, with the deployment of reinforcements to Alemao, yet they felt compelled to attack the UPP unit regardless.

It is also worth noting that in Alemao and neighboring Penha, another large favela, the UPP have 25 percent fewer personnel deployed in the neighborhood than the military had before them, according to news site IG. The police also reportedly carry less powerful equipment, making them more vulnerable than soldiers.

[Junior]

New Rio de Janeiro Police Force Reduce Favela Violence: Study
Written by Julia Michaels, InSight, Monday, July 30, 2012

With the expansion of Rio de Janeiro's innovative 'pacification' police program, the first rigorous study of the program's effectiveness offers overwhelmingly positive findings.

Ever since pacification began in Rio de Janeiro, in November 2008, we’ve been hearing (and saying) that social needs must also be met. As the number of UPPs, or police pacification units, grows (now at 26, employing 5,000 men and women, with a goal of 40 by 2014), State Public Safety Secretary José Mariano Beltrame -- and many others -- repeat the mantra about the other side of the coin.

The Social UPP got off to a shaky start, with Governor Sérgio Cabral’s political needs shoving it out of the state nest in December 2010, into the municipal one, under the aegis of the Pereira Passos Institute. From day one however, it’s been run by Ricardo Henriques (who next week hands his post over to former Municipal Finance Secretary Eduarda La Rocque, who is to keep on current director Tiago Borba) and a growing team, in partnership with the U.N. Habitat program.

Centuries of neglect and the mantra repetition have led to the general perception in Rio that police pacification is dangerously outpacing the city’s ability to meet social needs.

But the first wide-ranging examination of the impact of police pacification reveals that though it has significantly reduced violence in and around UPP communities, the project that lies at the core of Rio’s remarkable turnaround needs extensive reform itself.

Fortunately, the police are listening. Study coordinator Ignacio Cano, with a long history of research in the area of public security and human rights, is now in dialogue with the men and women in uniform. Hopefully, they’re poring over his "'Os donos do morrro': uma avaliação exploratória do impacto das unidades de polícia pacificadora (UPPs) no Rio de Janeiro" ["'The owners of the hill': an exploratory impact evaluation of the police pacification units]."

“Just a decade ago, whether in training or research, the police in general wanted little to do with the academic community and flatly rejected or refused to cooperate with researchers,” observes Liz Leeds, founder of the Brazilian Forum on Public Safety and creator of the Democratic Policing Initiative when she was a Ford Foundation program officer in Rio, in the early 2000s. ”Today that cooperation is not only possible but frequently sought after by the police,” continues Leeds. ”Of course, the police are not always happy with the results of independent research when the conclusions are negative. It is a process that involves the gradual break-down of long-held mutual mistrust and prejudice between the two communities”.

Optimism

Cano’s study, funded by the Caracas-based Development Bank of Latin America by way of the Brazilian Forum on Public Safety, took great methodological pains in comparing crime statistics. Which makes it particularly heartening to find that statistics for UPP communities, for police stations serving them and for their geographical surroundings, all show that UPPs significantly reduce lethal violence. Interestingly, they also increase non-lethal crime: robberies and such may be on the rise now (and/or being reported more) because the iron-fisted rule of drug traffickers is ending.

In UPP favelas alone, pacification saves an estimated 60 lives a year per 100,000 inhabitants.

At 227 pages, the study is a long read. But it’s a worthwhile investment because the numbers and analysis basically demonstrate that UPPs are pacifying the police and strengthening their institutional role in society. Because of UPPs, police killings are significantly down. Inside and near UPP favelas, this is the single most significant factor in reduced lethal violence. In addition, UPPs may lead cariocas to feel more compelled to report non-violent crime than they did before.

Another reason the study is a must-read are the excerpts from interviews carried out with favela residents, community leaders and police from a variety of levels of the hierarchy. This qualitative data provides valuable windows to the changes under way in Rio. For example, pacification has allowed some favela residents not only to come and go freely in their own communities, but also to at last visit those formerly belonging to “enemy” factions. The interviews also shed useful light on topics such as funk dances and "mototaxis," both murky areas of conflict between UPP police and favela residents.

Pacification was undertaken with a reasonable amount of planning, described in this two-year-old Piauí magazine article. It has achieved so much. But, says the study, the model needs further development. From some of the police interviews and from press reports and unfolding events, it’s become clear that the program is in many respects rather slapdash. Last week the first UPP officer was shot dead, wearing a not-so-bulletproof-vest and working in a container as an operational base. Later, other officers complained that the donated rifles they used to defend themselves against the attack, allegedly undertaken by drug traffickers, had jammed.

Of course pacification is a pioneering effort, bumping up against many unexpected challenges and outcomes, and so must be flexible. But it seems the time has come to buck the Brazilian penchant for improvisation.

Fifty years in five? Or six?

Meanwhile, the mantra about social services keeps on being repeated.

No large-scale impact study of the Social UPP has been undertaken or is under way. It’s quite a bit easier to quantify violent deaths than to measure social needs and how much they’re being met– not least of all because live people have conversations.

“Dialogue with results is possible, and is a continuous exercise,” Ricardo Henriques told RioRealblog on one of his last days on the job. Knowing how to listen critically he added, is key. Job training for youth was a top demand in one pacified favela, for example, but it turned out the area did have job training, with empty classrooms. “It’s a question of matching, of information flow. You have to have a lot of information about a community,” he said.

As Henriques spoke, Gustavo Ferreira, responsible for the Social UPP’s Fast Participatory Mapping of UPP Favelas, swiveled a computer screen and brought up a Google Maps-based product of the program’s 11 field teams in 20 territories. Work began a year ago, with the help of consultant Francesco di Villarosa. The teams take photographs, make observations and interview residents, leaders, NGO agents, and public service providers. Results change constantly and are analyzed so as to pass on demands to agencies who can and should be meeting them. The Social UPP also works with NGOs and the private sector.

Among other data, the maps show which parts of favelas are at risk for mudslides and the like. Most impressive are the photos of contemporary housing that looks like something out of the film "Black Orpheus." Not all favela homes today are made of brick and cement.

If all the mapped data were to be posted on the Internet it could clear up a great deal of doubt about life in pacified favelas and the challenges they present to the city of Rio -- for people who live in them and for those who don’t, as well. Making this data available to researchers would also open the door to an impact study.

When President Juscelino Kubitschek got it into his head to build Brasília in the 1950s, he spoke about pushing the country ahead fifty years, in only five. What Rio is doing to prepare for its growing list of megaevents is a comparable task: police manpower has grown exponentially over the last few years, with shortcuts in preparation that they themselves fault. The force for all of Rio state, including 5,000 pacification police, totals 40,000-plus today and is set to grow to 60,000 by 2014.

Setting up police pacification units (guys with guns in snappy uniforms, who’ve had six months’ training) looks a great deal easier than mapping and meeting needs for trash collection, health care, public lighting, education, day care, legal aid, and so much else. But it may well turn out that both sides of the coin are equally challenging.

Perhaps it’s time for a new mantra? Here are the UPP impact study’s recommendations to Rio’s pacification police force:

1. Include local homicide rates in the criteria for selecting new UPP areas. This could have a systemic effect, sending a message to organized crime to bring down the violence level or “lose” their territories.

2.Systematize working criteria and procedures. Police and residents need to know how disturbances of the peace, mototaxis and funk dances are to be dealt with, for example. Police need to know what to do when children describe drug use at home, and what types of performance will be rewarded.

3.Improve work facilities and reformulate pay bonuses. Current pay delays damage morale.

4.Intensify and improve training. One or two weeks of proximity policing techniques cannot undo pre-formed values and behaviors.

5.Take measures to legitimate police pacification within the Military Police. Police lethality reduction goals, linked to bonuses, would help to mitigate the rejection of UPP police by the rest of the force.

6.Rethink police response to drug crime. The change in focus from drugs to weapons should be more complete and even-handed, and the police should no longer repress drug-related cultural manifestations such as funk dances as if these were enemy territory. In doing so they will gain the trust of young people, who now often consider their actions arbitrary and unjust.

7.Deepen the community component of UPPs. There should be more interaction between police and residents, at all levels. This will increase police identification with the project.

8.Promote mechanisms for community decision-making. This should help fill the authority vacuum left by drug traffickers, which police have been stepping into in an irregular and controversial manner.

9.Promote community representation and political participation. The study points out this missing element in the pacification equation, adding that a police role is questionable for this item, though it should be taken into consideration as other issues are sorted out.